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ASPECT OF JAPANESE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Masahiko Aoki* 
1. INTRODU~ION 
This paper describes an emerging aspect of Japanese industrial organiza- 
tion and inquires into the nature of the entrepreneurshp operating therein. 
Posing the problem in this way immediately raises one fundamental question. 
That is, are there any temporal or national variations in the pattern of 
entrepreneurial behavior in modern firms? My own answer to this question, as 
presented here, is simply in the affirmative. I will submit that, from the begin- 
ning of the 1970s onward, the most important function of the entrepreneur has 
become that of adapting the internal structure and external behavior of firms 
quickly, flexibly, and innovatively to increasing environmental uncertainties 
caused by such factors as supply shocks, the new opportunities that have 
opened up for technological innovation, the absolute as well as relative variabil- 
ity of prices, interest rates, and exchange rates, etc. I will further argue that 
Japanese firms have responded to this task by developing a rather new form of 
industrial organization, which I will term the "quasi-tree structure." 
2. THE SCHUMP- VIEW OF THE ENTREPRENEUR 
In the beginning there was the (neo)classical notion of entrepreneurship - 
the unification of risk-bearing and control of production -- and many theoreti- 
cians still talk about entrepreneurship in these terms. In spite of the apparent 
separation of the two functions in modern firms between risk-taking sharehold- 
ers and controlling managers, this (neo)classical concept has been vigorously 
defended (for example, by Frank Knight) on the basis that this separation is 
deceptive because ultimate control is still in the hands of shareholders who 
select managers who exercise only relatively routine control over business 
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affairs. The relevance and accuracy of this view seems, however, to be eroding 
in the eyes of many observers. Indeed, portfolio theory tells us that the 
optimal portfolio for any one investor is likely to be diversified across the 
shares of many firms. Since he holds shares in many firms precisely to avoid 
having his wealth depend too much upon any single firm, an individual share- 
holder generally has neither any special interest in, nor power to, personally 
control a specific management effectively. 
Joseph Schurnpeter then proposed an attractive concept of entrepreneur- 
ship;which seemed to cope with this situation better. In short, he identified 
entrepreneurship with the "mechanism of changeo1 and the entrepreneur with 
the bearer of this mechanism. Anyone who actually fulfills this function is an 
entrepreneur; the employed managers can be entrepreneurs, while sharehold- 
ers per s e  are not, although individual shareholders may be. This much seems 
to be all right, but Schumpeter's position came to be identified more with his 
later, less universal, claim that entrepreneurship is closely associated with 
"bigness". He argued that in innovative efforts there are increasing returns 
both to the size of innovative activities (R&D establishment) and to the size of 
the firm. Further, innovation requires a relatively size able commitment of 
resources and commensurate returns to make it worthwhile. Thus only a firm 
that can attain at  least temporary monopoly power will find innovation either 
attractive or possible . Various empirical evidence contrary to this claim has 
been accumulated (see for example Scherer 1967, Kamien and Schwartz 1975) 
but, in order to develop my own views on entrepreneurship, I dare to reiterate 
here the arguments as to why large size per s e  is n o t  conducive to innovation, 
particularly in the newly developing industrial situation in the 1970s and 1980s. 
3. A D A P T A B r n  AND SIm 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese and West European firms were very much 
obsessed with their small size relative to their American rivals and, in the face 
of increasing international competition for domestic markets, strove for larger 
size through internal growth as well as mergers. The main emphasis then was 
on cost reduction through the exploitation of economies of scale and scope, 
financial viability, large-scale R&D establishments, etc. But, as Burton Klein 
has recently emphatically argued (Klein 1979), there are serious questions as 
to whether such physical bases for short-run cost reduction are compatible 
with market openness of managerial ability to quickly feed back market infor- 
mation into the development of truly technologically innovative products. The 
incompatibility of bureaucracy with inventiveness may also manifest itself 
because of long lines of communications and resulting inefficient utilization of 
knowledge dispersal within the firm. As Frederick Hayek (1945) argued con- 
vincingly some time ago in the context of the market planning vs. central plan- 
ning issue, economically useful knowledge is never confined to research labs. 
As the relative success of the recent "quality control movement" at  Japanese 
factories may indicate, collectively accumulated knowledge on the shop floor 
and other levels can lead to piecemeal improvements and innovations concern- 
ing productive processes, the aggregate result of which may very well be non- 
negligible. But bureaucracies tend to be insensitive to internal voices from 
below. 
One of the organizational innovations designed to cope with bureaucratic 
inefficiency in large-sized firms was the introduction of the multidwisional 
firm. But, ironically, this organizational form has itself created another prob- 
lem. In order to control and manage multiple divisions engaged in diverse 
activities effectively, financial specialists who operate in the common 
denominator of dollars have become increasingly influential and dominant in 
the top management of multidivisional firms, while the importance of other 
managers specialized in marketing, engineering, and personnel policy has 
tended to decline to a secondary position. The financial specialists are trained 
and thoroughly attuned to strive for the incessant pursuit of share-price max- 
imization. However, as the recent theoretical literature on shareholder unan- 
imity suggests, share-price maximization may not be an efficient collective 
objective even from the shareholders' point of view, i f  there is firm-specific risk 
involved in investment and if the shareholders disagree in risk assessment and 
attitudes toward risk. 
Further, myopic share-price maximization may lead to  another type of 
internal inefficiency, if it is combined with inflexible wage adjustments. As the 
firm-specific employment structure emerges, the bargaining "game" between 
the manager (as an agent of the shareholders) and the employees ceases to be 
of the zero-sum type and becomes one of the integrative type, to use Raiffa's 
terminology (Raiffa 1982). That is, in certain circumstances it is possible to 
increase the size of the "pie" to mutual advantage by trading between the 
current wage level and other benefits accruing to  employees (better job secu- 
rity or chances of promotion, etc.) made possible through the growth of the 
firm. But, as I suggested elsewhere (Aoki 1982), if the management strives to 
adjust managerial policies, for example, on employment and investment, so as 
to maximize the share-price in changing environments, while wage levels are 
fixed for a relatively long period, the firm tends to choose Pareto-inefficient 
outcomes from the viewpoint of existing employees and current shareholders. 
The chosen policies tend to curtail nonwage benefits accruing to the employ- 
ees; and the employees are likely to retaliate by demanding higher wages at  
the next round of management-union negotiations. A higher wage level would, 
in turn, restrict the adaptability of the management to the external environ- 
ment. This is clearly a "prisoners' dilemma" situation. What is to blame here is 
not share-price maximization per se, but myopic share-price maximization 
combined with inflexible wage adjustments. Managers' innovative adaptability 
is also limited by the inflexibility of human resource management in general, 
extending to  rigid job specifications and restrictions on interjob transfers, 
which are not- but a disguised form of control over employment by the 
unions. 
In summary, exclusive emphasis on the physical basis of technological 
achievement, bureaucratic stifling of internal communication, myopic share- 
price maximization, and inflexible human resource management seem to have 
severely limited the adaptability of large organizations to changes in the cor- 
porate environment. But during the period of relatively stable growth in the 
1Q60s, this increasing lack of adaptability did not appear to  outweigh to any 
significant degree those benefits accruing from "bigness". 
In the 1970s, however, the environment changed drastically. The sudden 
large rise in raw material prices and the sharp slow-down in total factor pro- 
ductivity growth plagued most industrialized economies. Various newly indus- 
trialized countries successfully penetrated into the traditional domains of 
Western industries. The new prospect for technological innovation cast doubt 
on the wisdom of exclusive emphasis on short-run cost-benefit thinking, whilst 
favoring ventures involving the future transformation of initially costly innova- 
tive products into well-accepted consumer commodities. A series of changes 
or reversals in government spending policies, high and volatile rates of infla- 
tion, and greater instability of foreign exchange and interest rates have contri- 
buted additional uncertainty to the corporate economic environment. 
The entreprenurial function under such circumstances has been very 
neatly summarized by Paul Geroski and Alexis Jacquernin (1983, pp.7,8) as fol- 
lows: 
"Important supply shocks require the ability to adapt to a new 
environment, to create and rapidly implement new techniques or 
methods of operation, to shift resources into new fields and away 
from traditional areas of activity. It is less a question of minimizing 
costs given known techniques and fairly stable factor prices and pro- 
duct demands as one of finding and developing new techniques and 
products appropriate for very different factor price constellations 
and shifting grounds of comparative advantage. Indeed in such cases, 
the need for flexible and reasonably rapid adjustment to  new cir- 
cumstances is liable to require some sacrifice of static efficiency and 
the need to do new things fairly rapidly impedes the intensive study 
and perfection needed to do them well." 
The problem facing us now is: what mechanism can be conducive t o  such flexi- 
ble, quick, and innovative adaptation without sacrificmg some of the advan- 
tages associated with "bigness" such as the availability of internal funds, the 
avoidance of costly duplication of inventive activities, risk spreading through 
diversification, etc.? 
4. QUASI-DISINTEGRATION OF FTRMS 
One of the recent measures widely adopted by large Japanese firms to 
enhance their flexible adaptability while retaining advantages of scale already 
achieved is the extensive development of subsidiaries and subcontracting. We 
will begin with a discussion of subsidiaries. 
The quasi-disintegration tendency involved in the setting up of subsidiaries 
is remarkably different from the parallel departure of engineers and managers 
from large established firms in the United States, in that the initiative in Japan 
Lies with the existing firms. Subsidiaries are  created by large Japanese firms 
by hiving off their own managers and letting them organize h ther to  internal- 
ized functions or completely new activities from scratch in the form of new 
firms, more often than by acquiring existing firms. 
Table 1 summarizes the extent of this hiving off in terms of the extent to 
which subsidiaries have been set  up over the period 1966-1982 by the firms 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, across all industries, in three selected 
industries, and in two leading firms in the electric machinery and electronics 
industry. Matsushita Electric Machinery Corporation and Hitachi Manufactur- 
ing Corporation are, respectively, the first and second largest firms in that 
industry in terms of sales. HVFI is the ratio of (aggregated) investment by the 
firm(s) concerned in its (their) subsi&aries to  the value of its (their) own paid- 
in capital. Subsi&aries are defined as those firms for which 50% or more of the 
stock is owned by parent firms. HVF2 denotes the ratio of (aggregated) invest- 
ments by the firm(s) concerned in its (their) "related firms" (kankei-kaisha) to 
the value of its (their) own paid-in capital. Related firms are defined as those 
firms for which 20% or more of the stock is owned by the lirm itself and its own 
parent firm, if such exists. Since reciprocal shareholdings by subsidiaries in 
their parent firms' stock were permissible until recently (and reciprocal share- 
holdings by nonsubsidiary but related firms are still permitted and practiced 
TABLE 1 Hiving-off rates, 1966-1982. 
Year All Manufacturing 
industries industries 
HVFI HVFl 
1966 10.8 11.0 
1967 12.0 12.4 
1968 12.8 13.0 
1969 14.1 13.9 
1970 15.3 15.1 
Electric Matsushita 
machinery and 
electronics industries 
HVFl H VF2 HVFI HVF2 
Hitachi Pharmaceutical 
industry 
HVFl HVF2 HVFl HVF2 
to a certain degree), aggregated HVFZ values exaggerate the extent of the 
control exercised by the listed firms concerned, but HVFZs for individual large 
firms such as Matsushita and Hitachi, where no more than 20% of the stock is 
owned by any single holder, may give a more precise picture as regards the 
extent of control exercised by these firms over other smaller firms. Table 1 
was constructed from annual financial statements of the listed firms, and 
investments in subsidiaries and related firms are given in terms of book values, 
which are normally equivalent to acquisition values unless adjusted for possible 
capital losses. 
The table shows an impressive increase in the extent of investment in both 
subsidiaries and related firms by large Japanese firms over the last two 
decades. In one of the fastest-growing and most high-technology-oriented 
industries -- the electric machinery and electronics industry (referred to 
hereafter as the EE industry) - which we will examine particularly closely in 
this paper, almost three-quarters of the total paid-in capital values of all listed 
firms are reinvested in subsidiaries. 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results of pooling annual time-series data on 
HVFl and HVF'2 for all listed firms in the EE industry over the period 1866- 
1982 and running linear regressions on the logarithm of various indexes of firm 
size end time variables, where: 
S Z R 1  = the size of a firm in terms of shareholders' equity plus various 
nontaxable reserves divided by an assets price deflators2 
SZRZ = the size of a firm in terms of the value of tangible fixed assets 
divided by an assets price deflator.' 
S Z R 3  = the size of a firm in terms of sales deflated by a wholesale price 
index for the EE industry.* 
The regression coefficients are highly significant. For a given firm size, H V .  
increases at  between 1.46% and 2.10% per annum. There is a clear tendency 
toward increased hiving off over the period. Also, a 10% annual increase in vari- 
ous size indexes alone would contribute an additional increase of 1.0-1.1% in 
HVFl and 1.4-1.6% increase in H I E ? .  This may indicate that when a firm 
increases its size in terms of its assets or sales, it tries to preserve its flexibil- 
ity and minimize various diseconomies of scale through hiving off some of its 
activities by establishing subsidiaries. 
This propensity may be also inferred from the results (shown in Table 3) of 
employment regressions conducted by pooling time-series data for all listed 
firms in the EE industry over the period 1966-1982, where: 
LESR = the logarithm of the number of employees per unit sales deflated 
by the industry wholesale price index. 
INV = the value of inventory per unit sales deflated by the industry 
wholesale price index. 
The regressions suggest that a fair degree of economies of scale and a substan- 
tial amount (around 10% per annum) of technological improvement in labor 
saving have been achieved. But controlling these two factors one finds that the 
estimated elasticity of employment intensity with respect to H W l  is signifi- 
cantly negative. A 10% increase in HVFl is expected to decrease the employ- 
ment intensity by 0.93-1.56%, dependmg upon the size index used. 
TABLE 2 Hiving off regressions, electric machinery and electronics industry. 
HVFl HW2 
CONSTANT -15.6 -14.9 -24.6 -19.2 -18.5 -32.5 
(-6.2 1) (-6.02) (-9.02) (-7.12) (-6.98) (-1 1.1) 
LSZRl 10.3 
(15.7) 
LSZRZ 
F- VAL 207.6 217.4 196 312.3 335.9 308.9 
- - 
Figures in parentheses are t -values. 
TABLe 3 Employment regressions, electric machinery and electronics industry. 
- - 
LESR 
CONSTANT 3.454 2.368 3.438 2.338 3.586 2.539 
(163.7) (49.2) (162.3) (48.3) (159.9) (52.9) 
LSZRl -0.089 -0.089 
(-15.4) (-6.5) 
LSZRZ 
INV 
ADJ.R *R 0.672 0.740 0.664 0.733 0.692 0.753 
F- VAL 1573.2 1637.8 1527.6 1597.3 1739.8 1772.1 
N 2308 2308 2328 2328 2328 2328 
Figures in parentheses are t -values. 
If we include the INV variable in the regression equations, the t-statistics 
of HVF coefficients deteriorate, although the fits are improved in terms of 
adjusted R*R. The coefficients of INV are significantly positive. This may indi- 
cate that, when the X-efficiency of a firm declines through an accumulation of 
inventory relative to the size of sales, the firm tends to retain more employees 
as well. This is presumably due to the relative security of jobs in the short 
term with large Japanese firms, and the accumulation of inventory relative to 
sales is likely to be accompanied by redundant employment. 
5. CENTRALIZED OR D E C E N W Z E D  R&D? 
Having established that large Japanese firms hive off a great deal of their 
activities to subsidiaries, the next interesting questions may be posed as fol- 
lows. Do large firms hive off only routine production activities while retaining 
strategic activities, including R&D, in their own hands? Do parent firms spe- 
cialize in "brain" activities while their subsidiaries perform only "mechanical" 
functions? More specifically, are R&D activities centralized in parent firms? I 
have attempted some regression analysis regarding R&D, but data for the EE 
industry turned out to be quite deficient, since many firms including the two 
giants, Matsushita and Hitachi, do not report R&D expenditures in their annual 
reports. I adopted the simple classical expedient for coping with missing data 
by dropping all observations that lacked information on R&D expenditure, 
which reduced the sample size drastically. In order to  compensate for this, I 
tried additional regression for the pharmaceutical industry (hereafter referred 
to as the P industry), which is, together with the EE industry and the chemical 
and transportation-machinery industries, among the most R&D-intensive sec- 
tors and which has complete data at  least for the period from 1972 onward. 
The regression results are summarized in Table 4, where: 
LRDR = the logarithm of R&D expenditure of a firm deflated by the indus- 
trial wholesale price index. 
ENT = the entropy measure in terms of sales shares of all listed firms in 
the industry concerned in the previous year. 
For those firms in the EE industry reporting R&D expenditures, the coefficients 
of HVF are significantly negative, which implies that when these firms hive off 
subsidiaries, they also hive off R&D activities as well, to at  least some extent. 
On the other hand, the regression coefficients for the firms in the P industry 
are not significantly different from zero. 
In connection with the Schumpeterian hypothesis, one noteworthy result 
is that the elasticities of R&D expenditures with respect to size are significantly 
greater than one, indicating that larger firms are relatively more active in 
inventive a ~ t i v i t i e s , ~  other factors being equal. But note that our model is 
recursive and that relatively larger firms tend to hive off R&D activities, so that 
a certain amount of the observed reduction in R&D effort probably arises from 
this indirect path. 
The ENT variable is added here to examine the effects of market uncer- 
tainty and the degree of concentration of the industry concerned. As the 
entropy variable has a high correlation with the time variable (0.954 in the EE 
industry and 0.909 in the P industry) indicating increasing competitiveness and 
uncertainty of the markets over the period studied, the reliability of regression 
coefficients are not high, so that we are unable to confirm the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis that a higher degree of concentration of the market is more condu- 
cive to R&D efforts. 
TABLE 4 RBD Regressions 
LRDR LRDR 
(Electric machinery (Pharmaceutical industry) 
and electronics industry) 
CONSTANT -3.388 -3.023 -5.062 -2.172 -4.873 -3.677 -4.798 -5.820 
(-28.1) (-26.2) (-39.2) (-0.450) (-47.5) (-0.789) (-46.0 1) (-49.6) 
LSZRl 1.256 
(36.2) 
TIME 0.036 0.045 0.043 0.060 0.068 0.073 0.082 0.065 
(4.18) (5.29) (5.67) '(2.40) (8.78) (3.95) (10.3) (6.66) 
ENT 
6. REZATIONS OF SUBCONTRACTORS WlTH PARENT F'IRMS 
As noted already, Japanese firms, in addition to hving off subsidiaries, also 
avoid the inflexibility associated with large size through the ever-increasing 
development of vertical links with smaller firms from which they subcontract 
work or to which they supply other services. There are no statistical data to 
show directly the increase in subcontracting from the side of larger parent 
firms (subcontractees), but a good official survey of small and medium-sized 
firms is conducted by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
every five years. According to this Basic S w e y  o n  the Industrial Situntion 
(Kogyo Jittai Chosa, hereafter referred to as the IS Suruey) the proportion of 
small and medium-sized firms in all manufacturing industries with less than 
three hundred employees that are engaged in subcontracting increased from 
53.3% in 1966 to 65.5% in 1981. The proportion in the EE industry in 1981 was 
85.3% - among the highest overall. 
The so-called "dual structure" hypothesis, which has become somewhat 
outmoded in Japan in its original, straightforward form, but which still seems 
to be prevalent elsewhere, suggests that larger firms utilize and exploit smaller 
subcontractors as shock absorbers, thus causing the brunt of business-cycle 
adjustments to fall on the smaller firms through semifeudalistic exercises of 
power. It was held in the 1950s and early 1960s that t h s  semifeudalistic institu- 
tion should, and would, disappear and give way to a new egalitarian and freely 
competitive industrial organization as the economic modernization of Japan 
progressed. However, despite t h s  prescription-cum-prediction, more and 
more small and medium-sized firms have increasingly entered into 
subcontracting relations with larger firms. Is the Japanese economy tending 
toward a reversal of the modernization of industrial structure, thus 
strengthening the hierarchical control by larger firms? 
In order to consider this problem, let me point out three newly emerging 
aspects of subcontracting relations. First, the relation of subcontractors with 
parent firms is not normally exclusive. According to the IS Sumey, the aver- 
age number of parent firms with which small and medium-sized firms have sub- 
contracting relations, over all manufacturing industries, is four (three in the 
EE industry). This number increases as the size of the subcontractor 
increases. The average number of parent companies of medium-sized firms 
(with less than 300 but more than 200 employees) is eleven (ten in the EE 
industry). The possibility of multiple relations can enhance the bargaining 
power of subcontractors when they deal with parent firms, as compared with 
the situation in which they lack such outside opportunities. This tendency for 
overlapping relations is also codirmed by another authoritative survey con- 
ducted by Shoko Chukin Bank (hereafter referred to as the SCB Szlmey). This 
survey found that of 1952 subcontractors surveyed, 56.7% wanted to increase 
the number of parent firms while only 1.5% of them wished to decrease it. Ths 
desire for more extensive multiple relations is particularly strong among the 
relatively small firms, while relatively larger firms with more than 300 employ- 
ees aspire to reduce their dependence on subcontracting and orient them- 
selves toward more autonomous positions. 
Secondly, subcontracting relations are not primarily used as a business 
fluctuation buffer, but increasingly for the technological expertise and 
managerial abilities that the subcontractors have come to accumulate. 
Another recent survey conducted by the Agency for Small and Medium Enter- 
prises ( A  Sumey o n  the Subcontracting Situation 1982, Shtauke Klgyo Jittai 
Chosa, hereafter referred to as the SS Sumey) reports that the proportions of 
both subcontractors and parent firms that regard the buffer function as a pri- 
mary factor behind the spread of subcontracting was less than 10% of all firms 
surveyed. On the other hand, the reliability of product quality and the specific 
knowhow possessed by the subcontractors, etc., are regarded as increasingly 
important factors by the parent firms (SS Survey 1982). 
Thirdly, the absorption of shocks exclusively by subcontractors does not 
seem to be as widespread as it used to be; various types of risk-sharing 
between parent firms and subcontractors seem to have become more pre- 
valent. It has been noted already that, according to the SS Survey, the buffer 
function is not regarded as important either by parent firms or by subcontrac- 
tors. Instead, about one-third of the parent firms surveyed considered that 
subcontracting reduces the cost of production, while about three-quarters of 
the subcontractors regarded "reliable long-term relations" as a primary factor 
when entering into subcontracting arrangements. This indicates that, contrary 
to the stereotyped dual structure hypothesis, parent firms rather act as 
"insurers" for relatively smaller subcontractors in exchange for "insurance 
premiums" in the form of semimonopsonic gains. I will show later that this 
supposition does indeed conform with collective economic rationality. 
7. TREE AND QUASI-TRICE STRUCTURE 
The industrial organizational picture emerging from the above description 
is considerably different from that depicted by the dual structure hypothesis. 
The generalized dual structure hypothesis, combined with the stereotyped view 
of the role of government, as represented by the "Japan, Inc." theory, may be 
visualized as the "tree" structure shown in Figure 1. At the apex is the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which controls and directly super- 
vises a few representative giant firms. The latter, in turn, exclusively control 
smaller subsidiaries and subcontractors, which have further relations with still 
smaller firms from whch they re-subcontract, etc., and so on. The large con- 
trolling firms form their own, mutually-exclusive corporate groups. 
As an alternative to t h s  traditional view, we now visualize an emerging 
aspect of the industrial structure in terms of the "quasi-tree" structure shown 
in Figure 2. The structure of the tree is only "quasi" in the following three 
senses. First, the role of government is not one of unidirectional control, but 
rather one of an information exchanger and mediator for any cooperative ven- 
ture as the need arises. The government mediates among large firms as well as 
small and medium-sized firms. If we confine our attention to the sphere of 
R&D, the role of the government as a source of R&D funds is not overwhelming 
in Japan. As Table 5 shows, Japan ranks lowest among most technologically- 
advanced and R&D-oriented nations in this respect: a major portion of R&D 
research funds originates in private industry. In forming and operating the 
much-publicized Cooperative Research Labs for Very Large Scale Integrated 
Circuits in the 1970s, the government share in terms of funds contributed was 
limited. The essential role of MITI was to help organize two cooperative labs 
among six major competing computer manufacturers. Joint activities in 
manufacturing and marketing were avoided so as not to weaken the strong 
existing competition among the participating firms in the product market. 
Also, forming two labs rather than a single consolidated lab may be considered 
a good strategy, making the cooperative venture more robust with respect to 
the impact of possible mistakes. In practice, the Cooperative Labs were dis- 
solved after a predetermined period. 
Secondly, the structure generated by hiving off subsidiaries and utilizing 
subcontracting is "quasi-tree" in form since there are overlapping relationships 
between parent firms and smaller firms. In the rigid tree structure it is a little 
as though the members of a family (corporate group) cannot make friends 
(business partners) outside the family except when the family as a whole 
makes a friendship. It is structurally simple and neat. But the reality of the 
emerging structure is somewhat more messy. Industries are still loosely 
separated into several groups with large firms as their apexes, but there are 
now more overlaps. Smaller innovative firms are more willing to, and actually 
can, make contracts not only with their original parent firms but also with 
other firms outside the group. Also, the larger firms are themselves looking 
for more reliable and innovative subcontractors inside and outside their own 
groups, and want their subsidiaries to diversify business partners in order to 
secure efficient utilization of the subsidiaries' resources. There are generally 
more and more overlaps, and interconnections between firms are no longer 
necessarily solely through the medium of the groups they belong to.' 
Another aspect of the emerging industrial organization that cannot be 
properly represented by the tree structure is that the direction of innovative 
initiative is not rigidly unidirectional from the trunk to major branches and 
then to minor branches. As already discussed, there is growing evidence that 
R&D activities in particular and innovative activities in general are becoming 
much more decentralized and dispersed from the top to the bottom. Small 
and mediurn-sized firms lacking their own technological expertise or readiness 
to innovate are losing their competitive edge in forming stable long-term rela- 
tions with larger firms and may not even survive as viable members of cor- 
porate groups. On the other hand, even the larger firms may lose their stra- 
tegic position and yield their influential role in the group to their ex- 
subsidiaries i f  they themselves fail to adapt to changing environmental 
FIGURE 1 The tree structure. 
FIGURE 2 The quasi-tree structure. 
TABLE 5 R&D Expenditure and government funds. 
Government funds 
R&D Expenditure Government funds excl. defense R&D 
Country Year (million8) (%I (Z) 
Japan 1979 18,546 
1980 20,65 1 
US 1980 61,127 
UK 1978 6,955 
FRG 1979 17,369 
France 1979 10,373 51.1 37.9 
USSR 1980 32,269 46.7 -- 
Sources: Japan: Agency for Science and Technology, Indicators of Science and Tech- 
notogy. US: National Science Foundation, National Patterns of Science and 
Technotogy Resources, 1981. UK, FRG, and France: OECD, Internat iaa l  Sta- 
tistical Year. USSR: Central Statistical Bureau, The Statistical Year Book of 
the NaCional Economy. 
conditions quickly, flexibly, and innovatively. Any decentralization and disper- 
sion of control and innovative activities throughout the industrial organization 
is, needless to say, accompanied by a certain degree of dispersion of responsi- 
bility for the consequences, that is, the sharing of risks, and I will return to this 
point later. 
8. US/ JAPANESE CO~ARTSONS 
The quasi-tree structure as described above contrasts strongly with that 
of the arche typal American industrial organization. The stylized pattern of 
American industrial organization may be characterized by monopolistic com- 
petition among a few dominant firms, within which the tree structure is inter- 
nalized. When innovation-oriented managers and engineers spin out from large 
firms, they do so on their own initiative with the help of venture capital mark- 
ets. If and when these hived-off firms become technologically and financially 
viable and successful, they are sometimes reabsorbed into larger firms 
through acquisition for the realization of capital gains. This type of dynamic 
behavior offers an interesting contrast to that generated under the Japanese 
system of industrial organization, characterized by quasi-disintegration of 
large firms on their own initiative and a certain degree of overlap between 
groups. 
8. QUASI-mE VS. RIGID TREE STRUCIVHES 
What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of the quasi-tree 
structure vis-8-vis the rigid-tree structure and the nonintegral atomistic struc- 
ture from the theoretical point of view? I stress here "from the theoretical 
point of view," since vre do not yet know whether these advantages, if any, have 
been fully realized in the emerging quasi-tree structure, so that any remarks 
are bound to be somewhat speculative. 
One possible advantage of the quasi-tree structure over integral centrali- 
zation is that diverse innovative adaptation by the subunits to changing 
environments and evolutionary selection of appropriate dispositions may be 
relatively favored in the former. In large integrated firms, technological inno- 
vation is apt to be directed from the center on the single criterion of financial 
profitability. As stressed above, the long lines of communication within such 
firms may also fail to ensure the efficient use of decentralized knowledge avail- 
able a t  lower levels and potentially useful for innovative adaptation. Of course, 
the potential merits of the quasi-tree structure may be counteracted by waste- 
ful duplication of R&D efforts in multiple units w i t h  the structure and a lack 
of clear orientation of these efforts from the global point of view, but these 
disadvantages may be to some extent mitigated by the semi-direction received 
from larger parent firms. A more formal study of this issue of the relative effi- 
ciency of centralized pooling of knowledge versus decentralized use of 
knowledge is an important topic for future research. 
Secondly, the quasi-tree structure may make monitoring of subunits more 
effective. Some quasi-market discipline has been deliberately introduced into 
large integrated firms by creating multidivisional profit centers, but this is 
essentially an accounting gimmick. In the quasi-tree structure, however, 
subunits are autonomous legal entities and are more openly susceptible to 
profit-making discipline. If a subunit makes a great mistake, it may become 
nonviable through bankruptcy! 
Thirdly, the quasi-tree structure, in which subunits are semi-autonomous 
entities, may make the management of industrial relations more flexible and 
adaptable to diverse conditions. There has been a worldwide tendency toward 
corporate- or plant-level bargaining since the beginning of the 1970s as 
opposed to industry- or region-specific bargaining. This is a natural conse- 
quence of the growing importance of firm-specific employment structures as 
opposed to "invisible-hand" allocation. Particularly in Japan, the tendency 
toward corporate-level bargaining has been firmly institutionalized in the form 
of enterprise unionism, involving white-collar as well as blue-collar workers. In 
this situation, if the size of firms is too large, the union leadership may find it 
difficult to represent and satisfactorily aggregate the diverse interests of its 
various constituents. In some cases the maintenance of enterprise-based 
unionism that has no formal legal foundation could become difficult, leading to 
possible union rivalries within single firms. I suggest that one of the strongest 
motives for the quasi-disintegration of large Japanese firms is the need for the 
decentralization and localization of human resources management (see the 
Introduction to Aoki (1984a) for details). 
This view is, of course, somewhat akin to our old friend, the dual structure 
hypothesis, which claims that the benefits of job security through life-time 
employment, wage premiums, etc., are only available to privileged employees 
of larger firms and that employees of subcontractors must bear the brunt of 
business cycles in the form of insecure jobs, overtime working, lower wages, 
etc. It is true that there is some differentiation in wages and other conditions 
of employment between larger and smaller firms. But it must also be remem- 
bered that when subsidiaries and subcontractors have accumulated their own 
techmcal knowhow and expertise, embodied in human resources, job security 
tends to be extended to these employees as well (Koike 1984). On the other 
hand, if labor requirements decrease at a larger firm then adjustments are 
also made: first in the form of work-sharing, then in transfers of employees to 
related firms, and in extreme cases lay-offs or the strongly encouraged early 
retirement of senior employees, which are effectively discharges in all but 
name. This suggests that the bearing of business-lsycle risks is never strictly 
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unilateral, but is rather shared between employees of larger and smaller firms, 
albeit to different degrees. 
One foreseeable problem is, however, the following. As innovative competi- 
tion among smaller firms becomes keener through the increasing impact of 
"mechatronization" and other high technology, firms that are defeated in the 
competition may cease to be viable units in the quasi-tree structure. Further, 
through the introduction of mechatronics and robots, the advantage of hiving 
off human resource management may decrease, and larger firms may be 
induced to reinternalize some of the hived-off activities. Then the problem of 
unemployment or disguised unemployment outside the quasi-tree structure 
may become apparent, and a dual structure may reemerge in a new form. 
Some observers argue that the impact of mechatronics on employment 
will be minimal in Japan because of its less-rigid job demarcations, and the pre- 
valence of flexible job transfers within firms. But this view, although it may be 
valid to a certain limited extent, seems to me a little myopic and superficial. 
10. RISK SHARING IN THE QUASI-TREE STRU- 
The relative advantages of the quasi-tree structure so far discussed, such 
as the diversity of innovative adaptation, effective monitoring through profit 
discipline, and decentralized industrial relations congruent with the formal 
structure of employment of firms, may also be said to be available in the 
atomistic structure of the economists' favorite parable, in which small firms 
compete with and relate to each other through perfect competition. But one of 
the most important aspects of the quasi-tree structure, which distinguishes it 
from the invisible-hand mechanism, is the possibility of sharing long-term risks 
arnong a number of firms. 
If there is a vertically-related corporate group of many firms indexed by 
i = 1,2, . . . , n ,  facing external uncertainty as a whole and each having a dif- 
ferent degree of constant absolute risk aversion A (i) ,  then efficient risk shar- 
ing is realized when the group minimizes the collective risk cost defined by 
~ ( i ) o ~ ( i ) ,  where a2(i) denotes the ex ante variance of the i t h  firm's revenue 
(see Aoki (1984b) for details). Then, it is clearly more efficient to attribute 
more risk (larger variance) to the (relatively) more risk-taking firms. If one 
firm, j ,  is risk neutral so that ~ ( j )  = 0, then it is most efficient for the group to 
let firm j bear all the risk involved and to assure other firms constant reve- 
nues. The benefits to the group made possible by efficient risk-sharing in 
terms of the reduction of collective risk cost may be distributed arnong the 
member firms according to their relative bargaining power. Relatively larger 
shares are most likely to go to the (relatively) more risk-taking firms. In other 
words, risk-taking firms assume higher risks in exchange for higher benefits 
accrued as risk premiums. 
Now, in the quasi-tree structure larger firms a t  the apex are normally 
more diversified in their products and financially more viable. Therefore, they 
may be able to assume more risk by pooling and spreading risks, in contrast to 
smaller firms, which are likely to be more specialized in products and more 
limited in terms of financial resources. Therefore it seems more efficient for 
the quasi-tree structure that reLatively larger firms assume relatively larger 
risks in exchange for insurance premiums in the form of 
monopsonic /monopolistic gains. I have already suggested that Japanese cor- 
porate groups seem to approximate such arrangements. 
The long-term ez ante risk-sharing arrangement is not, however, in gen- 
eral efficient ex post, as the short-term efficient marginal condition is not 
necessarily approximated in the long-term setting. There may be an incentive, 
therefore, for some member firms to default on such long-term arrangements 
ez post unless there is an effective enforcement mechanism. In the rigid-tree 
structure, in which corporate control is extended over subsidiaries and monop- 
sonic (monopolistic) control is exercised over subcontractors by parent firms, 
the default on ex ante arrangements may not be so problematic, a t  least from 
the side of the smaller firms. But, as overlapping of corporate groupings 
becomes more prevalent and interfirm relations become more fluid, the 
maintenance of long-term risk-sharing arrangements that do not in general 
satisfy ez post profit-maximizing conditions may become equivocal. In these 
circumstances the realization of efficient risk-shifting may also become prob- 
lematic, unless relatively smaller firms become more risk-taking through 
increasing diversification and resource accumulation. 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper I have focused on the hiving-off tendency of large Japanese ' 
firms and examined its implications for the workings of the industrial organiza- 
tion. By examining the increasing overlaps between corporate groupings, I 
deduce a stylized model of industrial organization, which I refer to as the 
quasi-tree structure. I have hinted at  a few of the factors, such as diverse inno- 
vative efforts, effective monitoring, localization of industrial relations, and effi- 
cient risk-sharing, operating within this structure. These factors may make 
the system more adaptable and flexible with respect to external uncertainties, 
which is a performance characteristic that has been recognized as increasingly 
important since the beginning of the 1970s. One could say that, if 
entrepreneurship is now identified with flexible and innovative adaptation to 
external uncertainties (shocks), then entrepreneurship is now beginning to be 
dispersed throughout the quasi-tree structure rather than concentrated in 
large firms as Schumpeter anticipated. 
The quasi-tree structure is just one emerging aspect of Japanese industrial 
organization: its future is as yet unknown and its workings are not yet fully 
understood. But since economists have hitherto devoted exclusive attention to 
the dichotomy of centralization vs. decentralization, and since the stereotyped 
view regarding the Japanese industrial organization as a rigid hierarchical dual 
structure is still prevalent. this attempt to identify and formalize a new 
mechanism may be warranted. Nevertheless, much work remains to be done 
on the performance characteristics of the quasi-tree structure as compared to 
the mechanisms of pure centralization and pure decentralization. 
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NOTES 
1. See Schumpeter (1934, p.61). This expression is an addition to the English 
Edition. 
The shareholders' equity may not be a good index for measuring the size 
of a firm, for there is normally a substantial amount of off-balance sheet 
assets due to the lack of inflation accounting. Particularly, the underesti- 
mation of land value is usually nonnegligible. But I suggest that the share- 
holders' equity (the net assets) plus nontaxable reserves is a better index 
than the total assets for a variety of reasons, as I explain in detail in the 
introduction to Aoki (1984a). The reserves include the reserve for Employ- 
ees' Retirement Compensation; for this too, see Aoki (1984a). Specifically, 
SZI is the sum of the items (66), (69), and (78) of the NEEDS Corporate 
Financial Data hvided by the asset deflator given in the National Accounts 
of the Economic Planning Agency (1975 = 100). This deflator is available 
only for the period 1969-1982; for the period 1966-1968 we constructed it 
by extrapolation. 
3. Item (20) of the NEEDS Corporate Financial Data divided by the equipment 
stock deflator for the nonfinancial corporate sector, PIOP75 (1975 = loo), 
given by NEEDS. 
4. As a wholesale price index for the EE industry, we used WPI8OGO124 given 
by NEEDS. 
5. This result differs from what has been discovered for US firms; see 
Scherer (1967) and Karnien and Schwartz (1975). As is shown by Fisher 
and Temin (1973), the fact that the elasticity of R&D expenditures with 
respect to the size of a firm exceeds one does not itself confirm the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis without additional assumptions concerning the 
technology of inventive activities. 
6. As an example, Nippon Denso Co. Ltd., was first set up as a subsidiary of 
Toyota Motor Corporation, and, at the end of 1979, 22.0% of its stock was 
still held by the latter while 8.6% was held by Toyota Automatic Loom Co. - 
an original parent corporation of Toyota Motor Co. But Nippon Denso now 
supplies important car electronics equipment not only to Toyota Corpora- 
tion but also to other rival firms. 
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